Ex ante payments in self-enforcing risk-sharing contracts

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2299zbMath0883.90053OpenAlexW2002365155MaRDI QIDQ1371191

Michel Poitevin, Patrick González, Céline Gauthier

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/efe81fc156723b7cde30db4db57e60a817ef0223

zbMATH Keywords

long-term risk-sharing contractrisk-averse agentsself-enforcing constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable

Cites Work

• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• An income fluctuation problem
• The permanent income hypothesis: A theoretical formulation
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

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