On the convergence of beliefs within populations in games with learning

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2298zbMath0883.90135OpenAlexW2034713887MaRDI QIDQ1371193

Niels Anthonisen

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2298

zbMATH Keywords

learning rulesfixed normal-form game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

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• On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Potential games
• Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games

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