Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition

DOI10.1007/s003550050086zbMath0888.90036OpenAlexW1965859584MaRDI QIDQ1374820

Samuel III Merrill, Bernard Grofman

Publication date: 11 December 1997

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050086

zbMATH Keywords

existence of Nash equilibrialarge electoratestwo-dimensional spatial majority rule voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

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