Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

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Publication:1374882

DOI10.1007/S001990050164zbMath0892.90045OpenAlexW4253676391MaRDI QIDQ1374882

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Guangsug Hahn

Publication date: 18 December 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050164




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