Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games

DOI10.1007/s001990050173zbMath0892.90182OpenAlexW1995051473MaRDI QIDQ1374893

Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

Publication date: 18 December 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050173

zbMATH Keywords

rootsNash equilibriaindexShapley index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (7)

Slicing the Nash equilibrium manifold ⋮ Essential equilibria ⋮ Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium ⋮ On the indices of zeros of Nash fields ⋮ On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability ⋮ On (un)knots and dynamics in games ⋮ Essential components of the set of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium points

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