Adverse selection, bequests, crowding out, and private demand for insurance: Evidence from the long-term care insurance market

DOI10.1023/A:1007749008635zbMath0900.90204OpenAlexW1603483330MaRDI QIDQ1375554

Edward C. Norton, Frank A. Sloan

Publication date: 28 January 1998

Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007749008635

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

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