On the game-theoretic structure of public-good economies

DOI10.1007/s001820050046zbMath0888.90173OpenAlexW2235072422MaRDI QIDQ1376986

Yves Sprumont

Publication date: 1 February 1998

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2125

zbMATH Keywords

public-good economiestransferable-utility cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

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An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations

Cites Work

• Cores and large cores when population varies
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
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• How to share the cost of a public good
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• Convex Analysis
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
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