On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set

DOI10.1007/s001820050048zbMath0888.90170OpenAlexW1972256150MaRDI QIDQ1376988

Carles Rafels, S. H. Tijs

Publication date: 1 February 1998

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/14435da8-14ce-4845-8e54-45dafb7578e1

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityconvexityWeber set\(D\)-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games ⋮ Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games ⋮ Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core ⋮ A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura) ⋮ Cooperative games under interval uncertainty: on the convexity of the interval undominated cores ⋮ A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets ⋮ On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations ⋮ A note on isomorphism and strategic equivalence of cooperative games

Cites Work

• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set
• Cores of convex games
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