Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games

DOI10.1007/s001820050050zbMath0888.90175OpenAlexW2094244189MaRDI QIDQ1376990

Ross Cressman

Publication date: 1 February 1998

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050050

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamebackwards induction proceduredynamic stability.high degree of decomposabilitypervasive equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games ⋮ The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction ⋮ Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary stability in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Evolutionary Games in Economics

This page was built for publication: Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games