Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00765-ZzbMath0886.90186WikidataQ127976908 ScholiaQ127976908MaRDI QIDQ1377458

Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Publication date: 10 May 1998

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strategic stabilitycontinuous payoff functionsgames with compact metric spaces of pure strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (15)

Topological essentiality in infinite games ⋮ Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ Inefficient stage Nash is not stable ⋮ ON EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT FOR DISCONTINUOUS GAMES ⋮ Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules ⋮ Essential equilibria in normal-form games ⋮ Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement ⋮ Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies ⋮ On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games ⋮ A new proof of existence of equilibria in infinite normal form games ⋮ Strategic stability in Poisson games ⋮ On strategic stability in discontinuous games ⋮ Essential equilibria of large generalized games ⋮ Essential stability of \(\alpha \)-core ⋮ The existence of perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games

Cites Work

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• Local perfection
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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