The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00776-5zbMath0886.90199OpenAlexW2133283168WikidataQ126409337 ScholiaQ126409337MaRDI QIDQ1377472

Daniel G. Arce M.

Publication date: 26 January 1998

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00776-5

zbMATH Keywords

communicationBayesian gameTreaty of Versailles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (2)

Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game ⋮ Improving Nash by coarse correlation

Cites Work

• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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