Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00778-7zbMath0886.90016OpenAlexW1982894918MaRDI QIDQ1377475

Michel Le Breton, Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier

Publication date: 26 January 1998

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00778-7

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet choice correspondences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count: a binary comparison, Maximum distance between Slater orders and Copeland orders of tournaments, Representation in majority tournaments, Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences, Computing the minimal covering set, Rank-based choice correspondences, Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox, Making choices with a binary relation: relative choice axioms and transitive closures, Choosing from a large tournament, Choosing from a weighted tournament, The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

Cites Work

• Slater's winners of a tournament may not be in the Banks set
• Covering relations, closest orderings and Hamiltonian bypaths in tournaments
• Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Choosing from a tournament
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• The bipartisan set of a tournament game
• The Copeland measure of Condorcet choice functions
• The Voting Problem
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
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