Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
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Publication:1377475
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00778-7zbMath0886.90016OpenAlexW1982894918MaRDI QIDQ1377475
Michel Le Breton, Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier
Publication date: 26 January 1998
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00778-7
Related Items
The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count: a binary comparison, Maximum distance between Slater orders and Copeland orders of tournaments, Representation in majority tournaments, Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences, Computing the minimal covering set, Rank-based choice correspondences, Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox, Making choices with a binary relation: relative choice axioms and transitive closures, Choosing from a large tournament, Choosing from a weighted tournament, The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
Cites Work
- Slater's winners of a tournament may not be in the Banks set
- Covering relations, closest orderings and Hamiltonian bypaths in tournaments
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Choosing from a tournament
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- The Copeland measure of Condorcet choice functions
- The Voting Problem
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
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