Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic
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Publication:1377482
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(95)00785-KzbMath0886.90063OpenAlexW2048218250MaRDI QIDQ1377482
Publication date: 26 January 1998
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00785-k
Related Items
On the logic of common belief and common knowledge ⋮ Common knowledge logic and game logic ⋮ Common knowledge: Relating anti-founded situation semantics to modal logic neighbourhood semantics ⋮ Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ Being realistic about common knowledge: a lewisian approach ⋮ Philippe Mongin (1950-2020) ⋮ Common Knowledge and the Knowledge Account of Assertion ⋮ A modal logic of intentional communication ⋮ Strong completeness theorems for weak logics of common belief ⋮ Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic ⋮ Iterative and fixed point common belief ⋮ Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information ⋮ On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief
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