Best replies and adaptive learning

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(95)00792-XzbMath0887.90193OpenAlexW2070640879MaRDI QIDQ1377489

Joshua S. Gans

Publication date: 11 May 1998

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00792-x

zbMATH Keywords

best replylearning processesiterated elimination of strictly dominated strategiesmonotone game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Comparative statics under uncertainty for a class of economic agents
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Monotone Comparative Statics

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