On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(95)00797-0zbMath0886.90184OpenAlexW2094085210MaRDI QIDQ1377493

J. Ning

Publication date: 23 April 1998

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00797-0

zbMATH Keywords

mixed strategyevolutionary stableinstability of mixed strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

Stability and trembles in extensive-form games ⋮ Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
• Strategy stability in complex populations
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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