Team-maxmin equilibria

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0527zbMath0891.90179OpenAlexW2160124660MaRDI QIDQ1378009

Bernhard von Stengel, Daphne Koller

Publication date: 27 July 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/9bface81d2c74c6ac7a0ed77aebda257c87278e7

zbMATH Keywords

team-maxmin equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (7)

When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? ⋮ The duality gap for two-team zero-sum games ⋮ Decentralized decision-making in a large team with local information. ⋮ Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ Leadership games with convex strategy sets ⋮ Absorbing team games

Cites Work

• The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Value of information in two-team zero-sum problems
• Non-cooperative games
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