Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
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Publication:1378012
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0561zbMath0891.90037OpenAlexW2065944757MaRDI QIDQ1378012
Peter S. Faynzilberg, Praveen Kumar
Publication date: 5 February 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0561
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)
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