Selection in dynamic entry games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0571zbMath0891.90048OpenAlexW2082247053MaRDI QIDQ1378016

Denis Gromb, David Sevy, Jean Pierre Ponssard

Publication date: 27 July 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b88ba27654dd972d53040b44da7d74e2adc6e592

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric firmsdynamic competitionentry deterrencegame theoretic frameworksymmetric firms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY ⋮ EFFICIENCY IN DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY COMPETITION

Cites Work

• What do discounted optima converge to!: A theory of discount rate asymptotics in economic models
• Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing
• Efficiency of dynamic quantity competition: A remark on Markovian equilibria
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
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