Social learning in recurring games

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0583zbMath0891.90186OpenAlexW2036225920MaRDI QIDQ1378019

Ehud Kalai, Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date: 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1138.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

public informationBayesian stage gamerecurring game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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