Dual reduction and elementary games

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0573zbMath0891.90176OpenAlexW2080852280MaRDI QIDQ1378023

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1133.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Markov chainsincentive constraintscorrelated equilibriamediated communicationdual reduction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Strategic decompositions of normal form games: zero-sum games and potential games ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Is having a unique equilibrium robust? ⋮ Properties and applications of dual reduction ⋮ Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games

Cites Work

• Coherent behavior in noncooperative games
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Non-cooperative games
• Existence of Correlated Equilibria
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