An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria
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Publication:1378024
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0550zbMath0891.90187OpenAlexW2166674925MaRDI QIDQ1378024
Publication date: 5 February 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/9a4cd88f68da7f09a05796dc63147bb80ca3fff6
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