Ranking agencies under moral hazard

DOI10.1007/S001990050181zbMath0891.90040OpenAlexW1981767461MaRDI QIDQ1381089

Bharat Sarath, Edward Henry Robbins

Publication date: 15 March 1998

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050181

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agentfirst degree stochastic dominanceranking outputs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case ⋮ The virtue of being underestimated: A note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models

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