Stay away from fair coins: a Condorcet jury theorem
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Publication:1381339
DOI10.1007/s003550050088zbMath0894.90008OpenAlexW1967582702MaRDI QIDQ1381339
Publication date: 7 September 1998
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050088
Related Items (15)
The importance of expertise in group decisions ⋮ Epistemic democracy with correlated voters ⋮ A Decision-Making Approach to the Spam Problem ⋮ Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin? ⋮ Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records ⋮ The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem ⋮ Representative Committees of Peers ⋮ Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters ⋮ Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size ⋮ Comparison of the polar decision rules for various types of distributions ⋮ A general jury theorem on group decision making ⋮ Range of Asymptotic Behaviour of the Optimality Probability of the Expert and Majority Rules ⋮ Collective decision making in hierarchies ⋮ A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet jury theorem for heterogeneous groups ⋮ Introducing difference into the Condorcet jury theorem
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