Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition

DOI10.1007/S003550050090zbMath0894.90053OpenAlexW2047912275MaRDI QIDQ1381341

Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 17 March 1998

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050090

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriaentry costselectoral competitionthreat of potential entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment ⋮ Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning ⋮ The two-party system under alternative voting procedures ⋮ Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry ⋮ Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules ⋮ Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? ⋮ Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives ⋮ Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?

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