Reputation with noisy precommitment

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2344zbMath0895.90199OpenAlexW2088752236MaRDI QIDQ1381963

David K. Levine, César Martinelli

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/cesar11.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg leaderprivate informationlong-run player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items

Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information ⋮ Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result

Cites Work

• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Commitment and observability in games
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player