A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2337zbMath0914.90010OpenAlexW2065994192MaRDI QIDQ1381966

Shigehiro Serizawa, Stephen Ching

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2337

zbMATH Keywords

uniform rulemaximal domainsingle-plateaued domainstrategy-proof rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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