Protective and prudent behaviour in games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2338zbMath0895.90185OpenAlexW2028383015MaRDI QIDQ1381967

Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Freek van Megen, P. E. M. Borm

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2338

zbMATH Keywords

set of proper equilibriafinite games in strategic formset of protective equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (4)

Competitive environments and protective behavior ⋮ The concept of proper solution in linear programming ⋮ Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion ⋮ On properness and protectiveness in two-person multicriteria games

Cites Work

• Implementability via protective equilibria
• Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
• Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
• Protective behavior in matching models
• The Nucleolus of a Matrix Game and Other Nucleoli
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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