The theory of implementation when the planner is a player

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2318zbMath0892.90006OpenAlexW2567760490MaRDI QIDQ1381976

Tomas Sjöström, Luis C. Corchon, Sandeep Baliga

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4187

zbMATH Keywords

Nash implementationsignaling game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Credible implementation ⋮ Repeated implementation and complexity considerations ⋮ Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ Voluntary implementation ⋮ Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation ⋮ Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player ⋮ Decentralization and collusion ⋮ Two-agent interactive implementation ⋮ Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation ⋮ Interactive implementation ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners

Cites Work

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• Credible implementation
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Egalitarianism and incentives
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation and Renegotiation