Reinterpreting the kernel
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1381978
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2314zbMath0892.90190OpenAlexW1983030990MaRDI QIDQ1381978
Publication date: 1 April 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d48579a5d0490d23a8658d1f15dd5278b842fcb1
Related Items (16)
Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes ⋮ Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games ⋮ A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel ⋮ Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games ⋮ Signaling, screening, and core stability ⋮ Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem ⋮ Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value ⋮ Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games ⋮ Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set ⋮ The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games ⋮ Bargaining with asymmetric threat points ⋮ Bargaining and bargaining sets. ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- Stability and the Nash solution
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- The Nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems
- Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
- Perfect equilibria of a model of \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining
- A market to implement the core
- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
- The Bargaining Problem
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
- Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
- Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
- Multilateral Bargaining
- Convergent Transfer Schemes for N-Person Games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- Bargaining and Value
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
This page was built for publication: Reinterpreting the kernel
