Reinterpreting the kernel

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2314zbMath0892.90190OpenAlexW1983030990MaRDI QIDQ1381978

Roberto Serrano

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d48579a5d0490d23a8658d1f15dd5278b842fcb1

zbMATH Keywords

reduced gameprekernelmonotonic transferable utility games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (16)

Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes ⋮ Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games ⋮ A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel ⋮ Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games ⋮ Signaling, screening, and core stability ⋮ Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem ⋮ Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value ⋮ Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games ⋮ Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set ⋮ The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games ⋮ Bargaining with asymmetric threat points ⋮ Bargaining and bargaining sets. ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.

Cites Work

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