Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games
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Publication:1381983
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2328zbMath0892.90025OpenAlexW2025427075MaRDI QIDQ1381983
Publication date: 1 April 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://amsacta.unibo.it/5047/1/264.pdf
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (8)
Standardization and the stability of collusion ⋮ Generalizing Pure and Impure Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas to the Case of Infinite and Infinitesimal Quantities ⋮ Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach ⋮ PRIVATE AND SOCIAL INCENTIVES TOWARDS INVESTMENT IN PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION ⋮ Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market ⋮ The choice of prices versus quantities under outsourcing ⋮ Price or quantity in tacit collusion? ⋮ Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
Cites Work
- Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
- Price vs. quantity competition in oligopoly supergames
- On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
- Equilibrium prices in the Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
- Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints
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