Tie-breaking in games of perfect information

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0564zbMath0892.90183OpenAlexW1975045344MaRDI QIDQ1381997

Torben Tranæs

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0564

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamestrategic implicationssubgame-perfect Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (3)

On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining. ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Majority rip-off in referendum voting

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Individual and Collective Time-Consistency
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• Unnamed Item

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