Credit market imperfections and the separation of ownership from control

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2368zbMath0895.90014OpenAlexW2055638966MaRDI QIDQ1382005

Daron Acemoglu

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2368

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardadverse selectioncredit marketslow powered incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Costly information, entry, and credit access

Cites Work

• Equilibria in monopolistically competitive insurance markets
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Informational Equilibrium
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

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