Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
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Publication:1384013
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0598zbMath0896.90180OpenAlexW2165674263MaRDI QIDQ1384013
Publication date: 25 May 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/675140174b9d7e4e8526fe1ede6dbe1ec016107e
Related Items (9)
Nash blocks ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria ⋮ A note on pre-play communication ⋮ Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness ⋮ Epistemically robust strategy subsets ⋮ Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models ⋮ Language and coordination games ⋮ Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
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