Perfect and proper equilibria of large games

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0581zbMath0895.90189OpenAlexW2069401871MaRDI QIDQ1384022

Kali P. Rath

Publication date: 13 April 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0581

zbMATH Keywords

continuum of playersperfect and proper equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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