The three-legged race: Cooperating to compete

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0588zbMath0895.90192OpenAlexW2068764542MaRDI QIDQ1384023

Roberto Serrano, Iñigo Zapater

Publication date: 13 April 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e17266166bcd4faa15b5b65b0b1c3108f3c7768f

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumrenegotiationsfinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Harmful transparency in teams ⋮ Theory of mind predicts cooperative behavior ⋮ A dynamic model of patent portfolio races

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

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