Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
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Publication:1384024
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0596zbMath0895.90013OpenAlexW2111762283MaRDI QIDQ1384024
Publication date: 20 September 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0596
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