Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2332zbMath0896.90185OpenAlexW2088477390MaRDI QIDQ1385272

Nolan H. Miller

Publication date: 26 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/56a88e9ebf21a288379002b85af8243eb934d927

zbMATH Keywords

perfect Bayesian equilibriumdeterministic partnerships

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

On surplus-sharing in partnerships ⋮ Joint production in teams ⋮ Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents ⋮ Evidence disclosure and verifiability ⋮ Efficiency in sequential partnerships

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficiency in partnerships
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents

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