Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2327zbMath0896.90030OpenAlexW2040809683MaRDI QIDQ1385275

Matthew O. Jackson, Alejandro M. Manelli

Publication date: 14 June 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2327

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriaexchange economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites Work

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• Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
• Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Private information in large economies
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
• Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations
• Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Strategy-Proof Exchange

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