Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2329zbMath0896.90181OpenAlexW2065023638MaRDI QIDQ1385279

Sudipto Dasgupta, Hans Carlsson

Publication date: 26 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2329

zbMATH Keywords

perturbationsignaling gamenoise-proof equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES ⋮ Market signaling with grades ⋮ Noisy signaling: theory and experiment ⋮ Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games

Cites Work

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• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria