Contract design and the control of quality in a conflictual environment

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(94)00270-MzbMath0910.90169MaRDI QIDQ1388901

Charles S. Tapiero, Diane J. Reyniers

Publication date: 1995

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

quality controlcontractsgamescontract designquality inspection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production models (90B30) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (13)

Optimal payment scheme when the supplier's quality level and cost are unknown ⋮ Quality risk in outsourcing: Noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information ⋮ Consumers risk and quality control in a collaborative supply chain ⋮ Coordination of cooperative cost-reduction efforts in a supply chain partnership ⋮ The value of product recall insurance in a price competition with financially constrained suppliers ⋮ Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game ⋮ Quality coordination with extended warranty for store-brand products ⋮ A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game ⋮ Interactions of traceability and reliability optimization in a competitive supply chain with product recall ⋮ A note on ``Quality investment and inspection policy in a supplier-manufacturer supply chain ⋮ Quality investment and inspection policy in a supplier-manufacturer supply chain ⋮ TRANSSHIPMENTS IN HAZARDOUS ENVIRONMENTS: COOPERATIVE VERSUS NONCOOPERATIVE QUALITY CONTROL GAME ⋮ The price of quality claims

Cites Work

• Supplier-customer interaction in quality control
• Acceptance sampling in a producer—supplier conflicting environment: Risk neutral case
• The Delivery and Control of Quality in Supplier-Producer Contracts

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