Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's \(M\)-form firm

DOI10.1007/s001990050200zbMath0901.90177OpenAlexW3124573934MaRDI QIDQ1389234

Tatsuro Ichiishi, Murat R. Sertel

Publication date: 11 June 1998

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050200

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationBayesian incentive compatibilitycore strategyinterim stageprofit-center game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (6)

Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete ⋮ Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core ⋮ Incomplete information, credibility and the core ⋮ Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information ⋮ Debt contracts and cooperative improvements ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.

This page was built for publication: Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's \(M\)-form firm