Bid shading and risk aversion in multi-unit auctions with many bidders

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(97)81900-3zbMath0896.90075MaRDI QIDQ1389578

Dieter Nautz, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Publication date: 30 June 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionbid shadingcontinuous random stop-out pricemulti unit auctionsoptimal price taking bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Seller surplus in first price auctions
• Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders

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