The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(95)00068-2zbMath0902.90030OpenAlexW2093038453MaRDI QIDQ1390201

Heike Y. Schenk-Mathes

Publication date: 14 July 1998

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(95)00068-2

zbMATH Keywords

information asymmetryhierarchical planningdesign of a supply contractself-selection models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (4)

Coordinating decentralized linear programs by exchange of primal information ⋮ Hierarchical structures in organizations: A conceptual framework ⋮ Analysis of supply contracts with minimum total order quantity commitments and non-stationary demands ⋮ A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.

Cites Work

• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Hierarchical structures in organizations: A conceptual framework
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

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