Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00097-9zbMath0897.90196MaRDI QIDQ1390979

Bettina Klaus, Ton Storcken, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 22 July 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

consistencysingle-dipped preferencesstrategy-proofnessreplacement principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (18)

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains ⋮ Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby? ⋮ Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation ⋮ Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule ⋮ Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible ⋮ A characterization of the single-peaked domain ⋮ Tops-only domains ⋮ Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences ⋮ Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences ⋮ Single-basined choice ⋮ Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain ⋮ The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization ⋮ Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Parametric rationing methods

Cites Work

• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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