A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00064-5zbMath0899.90012OpenAlexW2086484250MaRDI QIDQ1391059

Roberto Serrano

Publication date: 22 July 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00064-5

zbMATH Keywords

implementationNash program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ Nash implementation and the bargaining problem ⋮ UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS ⋮ Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers ⋮ Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games ⋮ Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent ⋮ Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution ⋮ On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules ⋮ Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games ⋮ Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets ⋮ Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations

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