On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects
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Publication:1391261
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00044-4zbMath0897.90074MaRDI QIDQ1391261
Publication date: 22 July 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
absorbing statesself-confirming equilibriumbelief processmajority rule mechanismvoluntary contribution mechanism
Cites Work
- Local public goods with mobility: Existence and optimality of a general equilibrium
- Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
- Introduction to the stability of rational expectations equilibrium
- Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
- Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
- Fully endogenous mechanism selection on finite outcome sets
- Competition among institutions
- Evolution in mechanisms for public projects
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
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