Coalitions among computationally bounded agents

DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(97)00030-1zbMath0904.68167MaRDI QIDQ1391349

Victor R. Lesser, Tuomas W. Sandholm

Publication date: 22 July 1998

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theorybounded rationalitymultiagent systemsresource-bounded reasoningnegotiationcoalition formationdistributed AI

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68T99)

Related Items (20)

Conflict analysis ⋮ Characteristic function games with restricted agent interactions: core-stability and coalition structures ⋮ A linear approximation method for the Shapley value ⋮ Solving then-job 3-stage flexible flowshop scheduling problem using an agent-based approach ⋮ Negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent environments ⋮ Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games ⋮ Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions ⋮ Leveled commitment contracts and strategic breach ⋮ Principles and applications of continual computation ⋮ Comparison of distributed methods for resource allocation ⋮ Human centered processes and decision support systems ⋮ Plan-Coordination Mechanisms and the Price of Autonomy ⋮ Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium ⋮ Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation ⋮ An algorithm for distributing coalitional value calculations among cooperating agents ⋮ Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games ⋮ Leveled commitment contracts with myopic and strategic agents ⋮ A new algebraic modelling approach to distributed problem-solving in MAS ⋮ Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study

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• An Effective Heuristic Algorithm for the Traveling-Salesman Problem
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Principles and applications of continual computation

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