Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00938-XzbMath0897.90075MaRDI QIDQ1391618

Ján Zábojník

Publication date: 22 July 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

principal agentlinear incentivespay-performance sensitivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

How much inequality in income is fair? A microeconomic game theoretic perspective ⋮ Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship ⋮ Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives

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