Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00924-XzbMath0901.90070MaRDI QIDQ1391637

Paola Manzini

Publication date: 22 July 1998

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcommitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items

Strategic bargaining with destructive power.

Cites Work

• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
• Bargaining and commitment in a permanent relationship
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model

This page was built for publication: Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment