Central bank independence and public debt policy

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00003-1zbMath0901.90073OpenAlexW2135338579MaRDI QIDQ1391769

A. Lans Bovenberg, Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Publication date: 23 July 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(97)00003-1

zbMATH Keywords

central bank independencepolicy coordination(optimal) debt targetsoptimal preferencespolitical distortionsprice stability weightsstrategic debt management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (3)

Restoring the conservative central banker proposition under monetary-fiscal interaction ⋮ Debt-contingent inflation contracts and targets ⋮ The effects of corruption in a monetary union

Cites Work

• Fiscal policy coordination and EMU
• Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union
• A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
• DYNAMIC SEIGNIORAGE THEORY
• Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game

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